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Abstract
Faced with the problem of pricing complex contingent claims, an investor seeks to
make his valuations robust to model uncertainty. We construct a notion of a model-
uncertainty-induced utility function and show that model uncertainty increases the
investor’s effective risk aversion. Using the model-uncertainty-induced utility function,
we extend the “No Good Deals” methodology of Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [2000] to
compute lower and upper good deal bounds in the presence of model uncertainty. We
illustrate the methodology using some numerical examples.
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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the significance of unhedgable, illiquid positions
for individual financial institutions and for the global financial system as a whole. Indeed,
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision notes that
One of the key lessons of the crisis has been the need to strengthen the risk
coverage of the capital framework. Failure to capture major on– and off–balance
sheet risks, as well as derivative related exposures, was a key destabilising factor
during the crisis.1
While concepts like marking-to-market and risk weighting of individual positions are incor-
porated in all three pillars of the Basel III capital regulation, the academic literature has
lagged in providing a robust, model-free way of implementing these in practice. In this pa-
per, we propose a methodology to compute lower and upper bounds on prices of complex
(potentially non-traded) securities that is robust to misspecifications of the model of the
underlying cash-flows.
Our methodology incorporates a concern for robustness to model uncertainty into the
“No Good Deals” methodology of Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [2000]. The no good deals
methodology refines the lower and upper arbitrage bounds on securities prices by imposing
a maximal admissible Sharpe ratio for trading strategies: Just as arbitrages are ruled out for
giving investors a free lunch, so very high Sharpe ratios are ruled out on the grounds that,
if allowed, a very high Sharpe ratio would represent such a good deal that (Ross [1976]) it
should not exist in equilibrium. In this paper, we extend the intuition of Cochrane and Saa´-
Requejo [2000] and argue that investors should also be restricted in the set of models they
are allowed to use in computing the maximal Sharpe ratio. In particular, we assume that
investors evaluate alternative trading strategies using Hansen and Sargent [2008] multiplier
preferences. While an investor might have an estimate of the evolution of the underlying
1Source: Basel III.
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shocks in an economy, she recognizes that her estimate may not be the true data-generating
process. Thus, she considers a set of alternative models, with her preference for robustness
forcing her to choose the “worst-case” model in computing the good deal bounds.
Model uncertainty impacts the good deal bounds in two ways. First, since the uncertainty
averse agent assigns higher probabilities (than under the approximating model) to states with
lower payoffs (or higher losses), the good deal bounds are wider in the presence of model
uncertainty than in its absence. Intuitively, the lower bound on the price of the security
is the bid that an agent buying the security is willing to submit; in the presence of model
uncertainty, a misspecification averse agent fears that the security is less valuable than the
traditional good deal bounds would suggest. Similarly, the upper bound is set by the ask
price of the seller; in the presence of model uncertainty, a misspecification averse agent fears
that the security is more valuable. Second, while the right to dynamically hedge is always
a valuable one, we show that model uncertainty reduces the benefit of dynamic hedging
relative to static hedging (see Carr, Ellis, and Gupta [1998] for a discussion of static hedging
strategies for complex options). In particular, as the investor becomes more averse to model
uncertainty, the good deal bounds converge to the arbitrage bounds and the dynamic hedging
strategy converges to the static one.
We build on the results of Cˇerny´ [2003] – that the bound on the volatility of the pricing
kernel imposed by Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [2000] in their derivation of good deal bounds
is intimately tied with quadratic utility – to derive the analogous restrictions on the pricing
kernel in the presence of model uncertainty. More specifically, we begin by introducing the
notion of a model-uncertainty-induced utility function. The concern for model misspecifica-
tion increases the effective risk aversion of the investor, leading to wider good deal bounds.
Using the implied restrictions on the pricing kernel for quadratic, exponential and CRRA
utility functions, we formulate the no good deal problem in the presence of model uncertainty
and solve for the lower and upper bounds. Finally, we show how to estimate the degree of
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investors’ aversion to model uncertainty, and illustrate the method using some numerical
examples.
Literature Review
Our framework builds upon that of Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [2000]. Bernardo and Ledoit
[2000] simultaneously developed an alternative framework for constructing good deal bounds
which uses gain-loss ratios rather than Sharpe ratios. Cˇerny´ [2003] and Cˇerny´ and Hodges
[2001] explain how the use of gain-loss ratios puts the Bernardo and Ledoit [2000] framework
into a rather different category compared to the Sharpe ratio and generalised Sharpe ratio
based framework and, for this reason, we don’t consider it further. There have been some
follow-up papers to the work of Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [2000] - Hodges [2009] is a
comprehensive review - but as he points out, most of them are highly mathematical and the
economic intuition of Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [2000], and of Hansen and Jagannathan
[1991], and its potential use as a practical tool for practitioners and regulators alike has been
obscured.
The seminal contribution of the “No Good Deals” methodology of Cochrane and Saa´-
Requejo [2000] is to narrow the arbitrage bounds by additionally requiring that the volatility
of the pricing kernel is bounded which, in view of Hansen and Jagannathan [1991], is the
same as bounding the maximum available Sharpe ratio. The resulting good deal bounds
both rule out arbitrage and rule out the possibility of forming a portfolio of the complex
security (termed the focus asset) and of a set of hedging assets (termed basis assets) which
has more than some given Sharpe ratio. Just as arbitrages are ruled out for giving investors
a free lunch, so very high Sharpe ratios are ruled out on the grounds that, if allowed, a very
high Sharpe ratio would represent such a good deal that (Ross [1976]) it should not exist in
equilibrium. Hence, “No Good Deals” introduce a partial equilibrium consideration into the
pricing of complex securities but, crucially, without having to make any strong assumptions
(for example, the precise specification of investors’ utility functions) concerning the nature of
3
the equilibrium. This is especially pertinent to the pricing and trading of complex securities
where agents (typically employees of investment banks or hedge funds) are rarely acting on
their own account and hence personalised measures of preferences such as a utility function
(even if estimable) may be inappropriate.
Sharpe ratios de-personalise the selection of a criterion to narrow the arbitrage bounds.
If an investor (or, more generally, a financial institution) would be prepared to enter into any
trade that is either an arbitrage or that is expected to deliver more than a specified Sharpe
ratio, then she will, in all likelihood, be prepared to trade a complex security priced by the
same criterion. Further, Sharpe ratios are simple and widely used so it is likely that there
will be other investors (or financial institutions) who would be prepared to trade on the same
terms and who would therefore be prepared to take the other side of the trade should the
first investor decide to liquidate her position. Hence the use of Sharpe ratios gives a market
(as opposed to an individualistic) perspective.
Although the no good deals methodology provides a compelling and economically-motivated
way for investors to consider the impact of unhedgeable market risks on the prices of complex
securities, the recent history of financial institutions suggest that these considerations are
insufficient to incentivize market participants to be sufficiently conservative in their valua-
tions. Even before the global financial crisis of 2007–2009, there had been a series of financial
institutions (such as Bank of Tokyo/Mitsusbishi in 1997, Nat-West in 1997, Bankers Trust in
1998, Amaranth Advisors LLC in 2006) reporting large losses on their (supposedly, hedged)
positions in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. The losses have continued after the crisis.
For example, in April 2011, Reuters reported that Mitsubishi UFJ Morgan Stanley Securi-
ties (a joint venture between a Japanese bank and Morgan Stanley) had incurred losses of
more than 1.75 billion dollars on its positions in complex derivatives. Furthermore, these
losses were not attributable to the earthquake and tsunami which had struck Japan six weeks
earlier. Instead, Reuters directly quoted a senior official at the joint venture as saying that
the losses had accumulated (and we quote verbatim) “bit by bit” over a period of months.
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Whilst the exact details of how these losses arose is still unclear, the quotation suggests that
the positions were incorrectly marked-to-market or suffered from gradual hedge-slippage as
the prices of hedging assets diverged from their model predictions.
The aftermath of the global financial crisis has intensified political and regulatory scrutiny
of the hedging and risk-management of OTC derivatives. Although both the new Basel
III banking regulation as well as its predecessor Basel II specifically require banks to take
into account model risk or uncertainty, based on our conversations with traders at leading
investment banks, there does not seem to any consistent methodology to doing so. Some
banks do not follow the framework in this regard due to auditor requirements on mark-to-
market accounting, while others have ad-hoc valuation adjustments to their mark-to-market
prices for some types of securities but not for others. This may be due to a lack of a consensus
on how to generate mark-to-market or reservation prices, or it may be because traders and
senior executives are incentivized by bonus structures to maximize up-front profits and not
to place conservative reservation prices on their positions, especially for complex securities
with long maturities. Either way, our paper suggests a way forward by requiring investors
to incorporate a concern for model misspecification in their price estimates.
Model uncertainty has the additional feature of reflecting a different dimension of uncer-
tainty faced by market participants. The original insight of Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989] –
that Knightian (or model) uncertainty can explain the Ellsberg [1961] paradox – has more
recently been extended by Hansen and Sargent [2008], Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini [1999],
Hansen and Sargent [2001, 1995], Cagetti, Hansen, Sargent, and Williams [2002], Barillas,
Hansen, and Sargent [2009], Maenhout [2004], Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang [2007] and Uppal
and Wang [2003] to show that investors have a fundamentally different aversion to model
uncertainty. For example, Barillas et al. [2009] and Maenhout [2004] show that the classical
equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott [1985] can be resolved by allowing agents
to have robustness preferences over alternative models; Uppal and Wang [2003] show that
model uncertainty can also be used to explain the home-bias puzzle of Cooper and Kaplanis
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[1994], Coval and Moskowitz [1999] and Huberman [2001]. Additional studies examining the
implications of model uncertainty for equities and non-defaultable bonds include Anderson,
Ghysels, and Juergens [2009], Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and Zame [2010], Leip-
pold, Trojani, and Vanini [2008], Cao, Wang, and Zhang [2005], Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal, and
Wang [2012] and Cvitanic, Lazrak, Martellini, and Zapatero [2011]. Furthermore, recent
studies have demonstrated the importance of model uncertainty in modeling the prices of
complex securities. Liu, Pan, and Wang [2005] find that aversion to model uncertainty plays
an important role in explaining the pricing differentials among options on the S & P 500
stock index across moneyness (that is, the “smirk” or “smile” seen in implied volatilities).
Using a similar intuition, Drechsler [2012] finds that concerns for model misspecification
explain the large premia in index options. Finally, Boyarchenko [2012] argues that model
uncertainty can explain the behavior of credit swap spreads (CDS) on financial institutions
during the recent financial crisis.
While the implications for asset pricing and portfolio choice under model uncertainty
have been extensively considered, incorporating model uncertainty into the pricing of con-
tingent claims has been less well-developed. Boyle, Feng, Tian, and Wang [2008] argue that,
in incomplete markets, the multiplicity of available stochastic factors naturally leads to a
concern for model misspecification. Instead of following the literature on robust preferences,
however, they choose the optimal pricing kernel to limit the variation in the price of a con-
tingent claim when the underlying asset’s payoff is slightly perturbed. The main advantage
of this approach is to construct perturbations that are based on the volatility of the basis
asset, which is the pertinent quantity in pricing options on the asset. This natural link comes
at a cost, however, with the Black and Scholes [1973] model used as the benchmark model.
Furthermore, the authors focus on standard European options. While they briefly discuss
the pricing of other types of derivatives, the continuous time setup makes these extensions
non-trivial for the case of path-dependent or early exercise (American) options.
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In contrast, we make the lower and upper bounds on the value of a contingent claim
robust to model uncertainty by choosing the pricing kernel subject to a relative entropy cri-
terion. Thus, our perturbations are based on the conditional entropy of the pricing kernel,
allowing for non-Gaussian distributions even in the static case. An additional advantage
of our approach is in considering a discrete-time, discrete space (lattice) formulation. The
lattice approach simplifies the pricing of finite horizon, path-dependent options while em-
phasizing their illiquid nature. Further, any continuous space stochastic process can be well
approximated by a discrete lattice, provided that the lattice has sufficient states. Finally,
continuous trading is not always possible in real markets; the discrete-time formulation nat-
urally incorporates these breaks in trading activity.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the
“No Good Deals” methodology. Section 3 introduces model uncertainty and shows how the
Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [2000] bound E[m2] ≤ A2 should be modified in its presence.
Section 4 defines and solves for the lower and upper good deal bounds. Section 5 shows
how to estimate the parameter (Ω) that controls aversion to model uncertainty. Section
6 extends our methodology to multiple time periods. Section 7 provides some numerical
results. Section 8 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Good deal bounds without model uncertainty
We briefly review the “No Good Deals” methodology of Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [2000]
(in the absence of model uncertainty) and its subsequent extensions (Hodges [1998], Cˇerny´
and Hodges [2001] and Cˇerny´ [2003]) to alternative utility function settings. The starting
point of this methodology is to describe the distribution of future payoffs to financial assets
or outcomes of economic variables (such as interest-rates). This is equivalent to specifying a
reference probability measure P over the possible states of the world. Although our focus in
this paper is to allow agents to be uncertain about the probability measure P, in this section
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we ignore model uncertainty concerns and take P as given. This allows us to outline the
relationship between the “No Good Deals” methodology and expected utility maximization,
making the link between model uncertainty and good deal bounds more immediate.
Consider pricing a complex security or contingent claim (or a portfolio of these), and
assume that this focus asset (in the terminology of Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [2000]) pays
xc at time 1. In addition, assume that there are Nb basis assets, traded in an active, liquid
market. Each basis asset i = 1, . . . , Nb pays xi at time 1, with the time 0 market price given
by pi. We denote by p and x respectively the Nb - dimensional vectors whose i
th elements
are pi and xi, respectively. We assume that the agent in question does not know the pricing
kernel used by the marginal investor in the market and instead uses the prices of the basis
assets to inform herself about the possible pricing kernels in the economy. More specifically, a
candidate pricing kernel m must exactly price the basis assets under the reference probability
measure P, so that EP[mxi] = pi, for each i = 1, . . . , Nb, and imply the absence of arbitrage
opportunities, so that m ≥ 0.2 Notice that, since we do not assume that markets are
complete, there can be multiple candidate pricing kernels that satisfy these conditions.
The innovation of Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [2000] is to restrict the set of candidate
pricing kernels by requiring that the variance of a candidate pricing kernel is bounded from
above. In particular, the lower CNoMU and upper C
NoMU
good deal bounds on the time 0
price of the focus asset satisfy
CNoMU = inf
m
{
EP[mxc] such that EP[mx] = p,m ≥ 0,EP[m2] ≤ A2
}
, (1)
with the infimum replaced by a supremum for C
NoMU
. The first two constraints enforce the
exact repricing of the basis assets and absence of arbitrage. The final constraint bounds
the variance of candidate pricing kernels and implies (see Hansen and Jagannathan [1991])
a maximal available Sharpe ratio. Notice that the bound on the variance of the candidate
2See e.g. Cochrane [2005].
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pricing kernel must be large enough to allow for exact pricing of the basis assets; in particular,
we assume in this Section that A2 ≥ A?NoMU 2 where
A?NoMU 2 = inf
m
{
EP[m2] such that EP[mx] = p,m ≥ 0} . (2)
To solve for the lower and upper good deal bounds, consider two cases: (1) EP[m2] ≤ A2
binds and (2) EP[m2] ≤ A2 is slack.3 Rearranging the solutions of Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo
[2000], we can express the lower and upper bounds in the two cases as follows.
Case (1) EP[m2] ≤ A2 binds:
CNoMU solves: A2 = max
µ>0,v
{
2v
′
p− 2µCNoMU + EP[UT (µxc − v′x)]
}
, (3)
C
NoMU
solves: A2 = max
µ<0,v
{
2v
′
p− 2µCNoMU + EP[UT (µxc − v′x)]
}
. (4)
Case (2) EP[m2] ≤ A2 slack:
If A2 > max
v,µ
{
2v
′
p− 2µCArb + EP[UT (µxc − v′x)]
}
, then
CNoMU (C
NoMU
) equals the lower (or upper) arbitrage bound CArb. (5)
In equations (3) to (5), UT (V ) ≡ −(max(−V, 0))2, v is a Nb - dimensional vector and µ
is a scalar. The maximizations are made over choices of µ and v which play the role of
positions taken in the focus asset and in the basis assets. The restriction µ > 0 in (3)
(respectively, µ < 0 in (4)) corresponds to taking a long position (a short position of size
|µ|), at time 0, at a price of CNoMU (respectively, CNoMU) to solve for the lower (upper)
good deal bound. Notice that we can reinterpret (3) to (5) in terms of utility maximization.
3Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [2000] consider three different cases: (a) m ≥ 0 slack, EP[m2] ≤ A2 binds,
(b) both bind and (c) m ≥ 0 binds, EP[m2] ≤ A2 slack. It was convenient for Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo
[2000] to do so because case (a) yields an analytical solution. However, it suits our purpose to combine cases
(a) and (b) into one because the analytical solution available in case (a) is a special case of the (numerical)
solution in case (b).
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Consider, for example, the lower bound in the case when EP[m2] ≤ A2 binds. The investor
allocates her time 0 wealth between the basis assets and a long position in the focus asset
to maximize her expected utility at time 1, subject to the time 0 budget constraint, and
evaluates possible outcomes using a (truncated) quadratic utility function. More generally,
the “No Good Deals” methodology computes lower and upper good deal bounds which (1)
solve for a specified level A2 of reward-for-risk when such a solution exists or (2) are the
arbitrage bounds CArb when the maximum achievable reward-for-risk is insufficient to reach
the specified level A2.
The link between the bound on the volatility of the pricing kernel and (truncated)
quadratic utility is a consequence of convex duality.4 Using this intuition, Cˇerny´ [2003]
derives restrictions on the pricing kernel corresponding to exponential and CRRA (including
log) utility functions. These restrictions can also be viewed as restrictions on the certainty
equivalent associated with the relevant utility function or on the optimal level of expected
utility. Furthermore, just like the restriction on the pricing kernel EP[m2] ≤ A2 is equiva-
lent to a bound on the maximum Sharpe ratio in the economy, the restrictions that Cˇerny´
[2003]5 derives for exponential, CRRA and log utility functions are equivalent to bounds on
the maximum “generalized” Sharpe ratios.
To link restrictions on the pricing kernel with utility functions, Cˇerny´ [2003] considers
an investor endowed with wealth V0 at time 0. The investor, without a concern for model
uncertainty, maximizes her expected utility of time 1 wealth V subject to the time 0 budget
constraint
sup
V
EP[U(V )] such that EP[mV ] = V0, (6)
where U(V ) is the investor’s utility function. Cˇerny´ [2003] introduces Lagrange multipliers
to solve this problem for various utility functions. In particular, for truncated quadratic
4See Cox and Huang [1989] for one of the first applications in utility maximization problems.
5See also Hodges [1998], Cˇerny´ and Hodges [2001]
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utility U(V ) = −(max(V − V, 0))2, the maximum achievable value of EP[U(V )], subject to
the constraint EP[mV ] = V0, is
sup
V
EP[U(V )] = −(V − V0)
2
EP[m2]
=
U(V0)
EP[m2]
≡ U(V0 + CE), (7)
with the certainty equivalent associated with truncated quadratic utility given by
CE = (V − V0)
(
1− 1√
EP[m2]
)
.
Thus, the bound on the volatility of the pricing kernel implies a bound on the maximum
achievable certainty equivalent
EP[m2] ≤ A2 ⇐⇒ sup
V
EP[U(V )] ≤ U(V0)/A2 ⇐⇒ CE ≤ (V − V0)(1− 1/
√
A2). (8)
This gives us a dual interpretation on “No Good Deals”: “No Good Deals” can be seen either
as ruling out Sharpe ratios which are too high or as ruling out too high levels of expected
utility (or certainty equivalent) relative to U(V0) (or V0). While the first interpretation has
the advantage of being independent from the specification of a utility function for the investor
in question, the second interpretation will allow us to connect good deal bounds with model
uncertainty.
We conclude this section by summarizing the basic assumptions that we maintain through-
out the paper. We assume that there are S possible time 1 states of the world. We denote
the probability, under P, of attaining state s by P(s), for each s = 1, . . . , S. Finally, we
assume that
Assumption 1 (1) S, the number of possible states of the world at time 1, is finite,
(2) P(s) > 0, ∀s = 1, . . . , S, so that zero probability states have been pruned,
(3) the time 1 payoffs are finite in each state
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(4) there are no arbitrage opportunities amongst the basis assets, and
(5) redundant basis assets have been pruned.
3 Introducing model uncertainty
In this section, we introduce the notion of a model-uncertainty-induced utility function
and, similarly to Cˇerny´ [2003], derive the implied bounds on candidate pricing kernels.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume
Assumption 2 (1) The utility over wealth, U(V ), is bounded above by a finite positive
constant6 which, without loss of generality, can be taken to be zero. Hence, U(V ) takes
on negative values i.e. U(V ) ≤ 0, for all V .
(2) U(V ) is non-decreasing, continuous, concave and differentiable with U
′
(V ) ≥ 0, U ′′(V ) ≤
0, limV→−∞ V/U(V ) = 0 and limV→∞ U
′
(V ) = 0.
For future use, we also introduce CARA(U(V )) = −U ′′(V )/U ′(V ) to be the coefficient of
absolute risk aversion of U(V ).
3.1 Model uncertainty
We begin by describing the economic setting considered in this paper. As in the previous
Section, denote by P the reference probability measure over the possible states of the world.
While the optimizing agent knows the model P to be the best estimate of the data-generating
process given the information at her disposal, she recognizes that the model is estimated
from a finite data-set. Thus, she worries that the true model may be in a set of alternative
models P that are difficult for her to reject empirically. The investor guards against model
6This precludes log utility since it is unbounded. However, it is satisfied by the three utility functions that
we will be interested in: Quadratic, exponential and CRRA: U(V ) = β V
1−γ
1−γ , for (the empirically relevant)
γ > 1.
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uncertainty by considering asset allocations that are robust across the set of alternative
models. As shown in Hansen and Sargent [2001, 2008, 1995], Hansen et al. [1999] and
Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent [2003], this is equivalent to evaluating future prospects
under the worst-case model in the alternative set.
More formally, we index a member Pξ of the set of alternative models P by its Radon-
Nikodym derivative ξ = dPξ/dP. Notice that ξ captures the likelihood ratio between the
two models, and that the reference model P corresponds to the case ξ = 1. To keep the
interpretation of a likelihood ratio, we assume that ξ is strictly positive, ξ > 0, and integrates
to 1, EP[ξ] = 1. The model uncertainty averse agent then solves
inf
Pξ∈P
{
sup
V
{
EPξ [f(ξ)U(V )] such that EPξ [mξV ] = V0
}}
. (9)
That is, the investor maximizes her expected utility of future wealth subject to the ini-
tial budget constraint, while expressing her model uncertainty and desire for robustness by
evaluating her future prospects under the worst-case (minimizing) model within the set of
alternatives. The multiplicative penalty f (ξ) disciplines the agent’s decision making and
restricts the set of alternative measures. We assume that
f(ξ) ≡ 1− Ω log ξ, (10)
where the constant Ω satisfies 1 ≤ Ω < ∞ and captures the degree of investor’s aversion
to model uncertainty. As Ω increases, the agent becomes more averse to model uncertainty,
and considers a larger set of alternative models. In the limit Ω→ 1, the agent only considers
the reference model P, corresponding to the case of no model uncertainty. Notice also that,
with this form of f (ξ), we can express
sup
V
EPξ [f(ξ)U(V )] = sup
V
EP[ξU(V ) + Ωξ log ξ(−U(V ))], (11)
13
where we use the fact that ξ is a change of measure. The first term is the standard expected
utility term, computed under the alternative measure Pξ. The quantity ξ log ξ is the relative
entropy between the reference measure P and the alternative measure Pξ and captures the
distance between the two models in log-likelihood space. Unlike Hansen and Sargent [2008],
we scale the relative entropy by next period’s utility.7 Scaling by U (V ) has the dual ad-
vantages of preserving the importance of model uncertainty when wealth V increases and
maintaining analytical tractability. In our one period setting, this is the direct analog of
scaling by the agent’s value function, as in Maenhout [2004].
Finally, we can rewrite the optimization problem (9) as
inf
ξ
{sup
V
{EP[ξf(ξ)U(V )] such that EP[yV ] = V0}.
such that EP[ξ] = 1, ξ > 0, ξf(ξ) ≥ 0}, (12)
where y = ξmξ is the pricing kernel of the uncertainty averse agent under the reference mea-
sure P. Of the four constraints in (12), the first corresponds to the initial budget constraint,
the second enforces that Pξ is a probability measure, the third that ξ is a valid change of
measure, and the fourth ensures that ξf(ξ)U(V ) is non-decreasing in V . For future use, we
denote the set of admissible changes of measure (parametrizing the set of alternative models)
Ξ =
{
ξ : EP[ξ] = 1, ξ > 0, ξf(ξ) ≥ 0} .
7In the one period version of the setup of Hansen and Sargent [2008], the investor solves
inf
ξ
sup
V
EP[ξU(V ) + θξ log ξ], θ ∈ [θ,∞], θ > 0,
where θ is a positive constant which controls aversion to model uncertainty. In their setup, finite values of
θ generate aversion to model uncertainty while θ = ∞ corresponds to forcing their (additive) penalty term
θEP[ξ log ξ] to be so large that ξ is forced to be identically equal to one and hence is the limiting case of no
aversion to model uncertainty.
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3.2 The model-uncertainty-induced utility function
We turn now to the notion of the model-uncertainty-induced utility function. Switching the
order8 of min and max, we can rewrite (12) as
sup
V
{
inf
ξ∈Ξ
{
EP[ξf(ξ)U(V )]
}
such that EP[yV ] = V0
}
. (13)
In this subsection, we focus on the inner minimization infξ∈Ξ
{
EP[ξf(ξ)U(V )]
}
. Introduce
Ψ ≡ 1
Ω
− 1, (note Ψ ≤ 0), and g(ξ) ≡ ξ − log ξ − 1,
and let mins {−U(V )} and maxs {−U(V )} denote the minimum and maximum values of
−U(V ) ≡ −U(V (s)) across the S possible states. Before we solve for the worst-case model,
we summarize some properties of infξ∈Ξ
{
EP[ξf(ξ)U(V )]
}
.
Proposition 3 (1) infξ∈Ξ
{
EP[ξf(ξ)U(V )]
} ≤ EP[U(V )].
(2) In the special case of Ω = 1, ξ (s) ≡ 1 in all states s = 1, . . . , S and the inequality in
the first part holds with equality.
(3) As Ω increases, infξ∈Ξ
{
EP[ξf(ξ)U(V )]
}
is non-increasing (and strictly decreasing ex-
cept in the degenerate case of U (V ) being independent of the state s).
Thus, the expected present value of the agent’s utility is at most that under the reference
measure. Intuitively, since the reference measure P is in the set of possible alternative P ,
the uncertainty averse agent cannot do better than her utility under the reference measure.
The second part of the proposition shows that the case Ω = 1 corresponds to no aversion to
model uncertainty, while the last part shows that letting Ω tend towards infinity corresponds
to total aversion to model uncertainty. Hansen and Sargent [2008] show (section 7.4) that
their formulation of robustness has, at high enough levels of aversion to model uncertainty,
8since the argument is concave in V and convex in ξ
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a “breakdown point” at which the agent’s objective is no longer concave in her wealth. Our
formulation does not suffer from this complication. In fact, in the next proposition, we show
that ξ is bounded, implying that infξ∈Ξ
{
EP[ξf(ξ)U(V )]
}
is bounded below.
Proposition 4 The worst-case likelihood satisfies
inf
ξ∈Ξ
{
EP[ξf(ξ)U(V )]
}
= max
η
{
S∑
s=1
P(s) [(1 + Ωg(ξ(s))) (U(V )− β(s))]
}
, (14)
where β (s) are the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints ξ (s) f (ξ (s)) ≥ 0 and
ξ(s) = exp
((
1 +
η
(U(V )− β(s))
)
Ψ
)
. (15)
In the degenerate case that mins {−U(V )} = maxs {−U(V )}, ξ(s) ≡ 1 and we set β(s) ≡ 0.
Otherwise,
β (s) =

0, if U(V ) 6= 0 and
(
1 + η
U(V )
)
Ψ ≤ log ξcrit;
ηΨ
(Ψ−log ξcrit) + U (V ) , otherwise.
(16)
Furthermore, η satisfies η ≥ 0 and η and ξ(s) are bounded:
min
s
{−U(V )} ≤ η ≤ max
s
{−U(V )} , (17)
and for all s = 1, . . . , S: ξ(s) ∈ [exp(Ψ), ξcrit], (18)
with ξcrit the unique point for which f(ξcrit) = 0, given by ξcrit = exp(1/Ω).
Using the results of Proposition 4, we can now define the model-uncertainty-induced
utility function to be
UMU(V ) = (1 + Ωg(ξ)) (U(V )− β) , (19)
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where ξ is the worst-case distortion given by (14) (evaluated at the maximizing value ηˆ of η
in (14)). The optimization in (13) thus becomes
sup
V
{
EP[UMU(V )] such that EP[yV ] = V0
}
. (20)
Notice that, since the worst-case distortion ξ depends both on the reference measure P and
the space of basis assets, the model-uncertainty-induced utility function UMU(V ) is also
setting-specific. The following proposition confirms that UMU(V ) is a valid utility function
and establishes some of its other properties.
Proposition 5 UMU(V ) satisfies Assumption 2; in particular, (i), UMU(V ) ≤ U(V ) ≤ 0.
Furthermore, (ii), UMU
′
(V ) = ξf(ξ)U
′
(V ) ≥ 0, and, (iii), if Ω > 1 and mins {−U(V )} 6=
maxs {−U(V )}, then UMU ′(V ) is less than, equal to or greater than U ′(V ) according to
whether U(V ) is greater than, equal to or less than −ηˆ, where ηˆ is the maximizing value of
η in (14). Finally, (iv), the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of UMU(V ) satisfies
−U
MU ′′(V )
UMU ′(V )
≡ CARA(UMU((V )) ≥ CARA(U((V )) ≡ −U
′′
(V )
U ′(V )
, (21)
with equality holding in the inequality in (21) if Ω = 1.
Intuitively, the uncertainty averse agent places higher probabilities (i.e. UMU
′
(V ) > U
′
(V ))
on lower utility outcomes. Furthermore, model uncertainty increases the effective coefficient
of absolute risk aversion. Since (by a Taylor expansion), 1 + Ωg(ξ) ≈ 1 + Ω(ξ − 1)2/2,
the amount by which UMU(V ) is less than U(V ) is largest when ξ is furthest away from
one. This increases the curvature and, hence, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, of the
effective utility function UMU. This is a direct analog to the intuition of Barillas et al. [2009]
that the optimizing decisions of an uncertainty averse agent is observationally equivalent
to one with Epstein and Zin [1989] preferences. Further economic intuition on the model-
uncertainty-induced utility function is that it can potentially explain the equity premium
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puzzle of Mehra and Prescott [1985]. Since this property is not essential for “No Good
Deals”, we have relegated our analysis of this to Appendix C.
3.3 Restriction on the pricing kernel under model uncertainty
We now return to considering problem (12). The certainty equivalent CE of problem (12) is
the solution to
sup
V
{
inf
ξ∈Ξ
{
EP[ξf(ξ)U(V )]
}
such that EP[yV ] = V0
}
= inf
ξ∈Ξ
{
EP[ξf(ξ)U(V0 + CE)]
}
.
Using the results of Propositions 3 and 4, we can rewrite the above as
sup
V
{
EP[UMU(V )] such that EP[yV ] = V0
}
= U(V0 + CE). (22)
To solve for the certainty equivalent CE in equation (22), we use the methodology of Cox and
Huang [1989] (or section 2 of Cˇerny´ [2003]). We state the result for truncated quadratic utility
in the following proposition - the cases of exponential and CRRA utility are in Appendix B.
Proposition 6 Let β > 0 be the investor’s subjective discount factor and ξ be the worst-case
distortion.
For the case of truncated quadratic utility, U(V ) = −β(max(V − V, 0))2, with bliss point
V (where it is assumed that V0 + CE < V ), the certainty equivalent is
CE =
1
CARA(U(V0))
1− 1√
EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
 , and furthermore (23)
CE ≤ C ⇐⇒ EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
≤
(
1
1− (CARA(U(V0))C)
)2
. (24)
Equation (24) is the analog to the Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [2000] bound and clearly,
our bound reduces to theirs if ξ ≡ 1. Equations (B.2) and (B.4) in Appendix B extend
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bounds for exponential and CRRA utility functions in Cˇerny´ [2003] to the presence of model
uncertainty.
4 Good Deal bounds
In this section, we develop the good deal bounds that are implied by the pricing kernel
restrictions derived in Proposition 6. We focus on the case of truncated quadratic utility,
Section 4.3 and Appendix B consider the exponential and CRRA utility cases.
The setup is the same as in Section 2. Briefly, there are Nb basis assets. The time 0 price
of basis asset i is pi and, at time 1, it pays xi ≡ xi(s), in state s, for each i = 1, . . . , Nb.
The pricing kernel y must reprice the basis assets exactly. There is a focus asset which pays
xc ≡ xc(s), at time 1. We continue to make Assumption 1.
Notice that the model-uncertainty-induced utility function UMU (V ) satisfies the technical
assumptions that Cˇerny´ [2003]9 imposes to derive the relationship (in the absence of model
uncertainty) between bounds on the certainty equivalent and bounds on the pricing kernel.
This leads us to our definition of good deal bounds under model uncertainty - which we term
No Good Deals - No Bad Models.
Definition 7 Under model uncertainty, the lower C and upper C good deal bounds on the
time 0 price of the focus asset solve
C = inf
ξ∈Ξ
{
inf
y
{
EP[yxc] such that EP[yx] = p, y ≥ 0,EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
≤ A2
}}
C = sup
ξ∈Ξ
{
sup
y
{
EP[yxc] such that EP[yx] = p, y ≥ 0,EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
≤ A2
}}
. (25)
The first two restrictions are the same as in the traditional good deal bounds and enforce,
respectively, that the candidate pricing kernel prices the basis assets and implies absence of
arbitrage opportunities. The third restriction is new and replaces the bound on the volatility
9See Cˇerny´ [2003] Theorems 2 and 3.
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of the pricing kernel by the bound on EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
. Notice that the infimum (respectively,
supremum) over admissible distortions ξ in the expression for the lower good deal bound C
(upper good deal bound C) is equivalent to taking the worst-case distortion in maximizing
the expected future utility of wealth, as we show below. Notice also that, for (25) to have a
solution, the bound A2 has to be large enough to reprice the basis assets. In particular, we
require that A2 ≥ A? 2, with
A? 2 = inf
ξ∈Ξ
{
inf
y
{
EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
such that EP[yx] = p and y ≥ 0
}}
. (26)
Equation (26) ensures that the set Ξ of admissible distortions is non-empty.
Similarly to Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [2000], we consider two different combinations of
slack and binding constraints. In
Case (1) The constraint EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
≤ A2 binds (the constraint y ≥ 0 may be binding or slack).
The solution is stated in Proposition 8.
Case (2) The constraint EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
≤ A2 is slack. The solution is stated in Proposition 9.
To simplify the solution, we introduce a binary variable 1L/U which takes the value 1 (re-
spectively, −1) if we are computing the lower (upper) good deal bound C (respectively, C).
Denoting by δ a scalar, interpretable as the Lagrange multiplier on EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
≤ A2, and by
ϕ a normalization constant, we define the loss function Z(s,1L/U ,w, ϕ, δ) in state s as
Y (s,1L/U ,w, ϕ, δ) ≡ max
[
−1L/U (ϕxc(s)−w
′
x(s))
δ
, 0
]
, (27)
Z(s,1L/U ,w, ϕ, δ) ≡ (Y (s,1L/U ,w, ϕ, δ))2 = −UT
(
1L/U
(ϕxc(s)−w′x(s))
δ
)
, (28)
where w is a Nb - dimensional vector, interpretable as Lagrange multipliers on the constraint
EP [yx] = p. We denote the minimum (maximum) value of Z(s,1L/U ,w, ϕ, δ) across the S
possible states by mins
{
Z(s,1L/U ,w, ϕ, δ)
}
(maxs
{
Z(s,1L/U ,w, ϕ, δ)
}
).
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4.1 Case (1): The constraint EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
≤ A2 binds
We solve for the good deal bounds C and C by forming the Lagrangian of the constrained
optimization problem.
Proposition 8 When EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
≤ A2 binds, the investor’s marginal utility in state s is
y(s) = ξ(s)f(ξ(s))Y (s,1L/U ,w, 1, δ), (29)
where the worst-case distortion ξ and the Lagrange multipliers β(s) on ξ(s)f (ξ(s)) ≥ 0 are
given in Proposition 4, with the utility of terminal wealth U (V ) replaced by −Z(s,1L/U ,w, 1, δ).
The lower C and upper C good deal bounds solve
C = max
δ>0,w
{
w
′
p− 1
2
δA2+
max
η
{
S∑
s=1
P(s)
[
−1
2
δ
(
1 + Ωg(ξ(s))
)(
Z(s,1L/U ,w, 1, δ) + β(s)
)]}}
, (30)
C = min
δ>0,w
{
w
′
p+
1
2
δA2+
min
η
{
S∑
s=1
P(s)
[
1
2
δ
(
1 + Ωg(ξ(s))
)(
Z(s,1L/U ,w, 1, δ) + β(s)
)]}}
. (31)
Equivalently, with UT (V ) ≡ −(max(−V, 0))2
C solves : A2 = min
ξ∈Ξ
{
max
µ>0,v
{
2v
′
p− 2µC + EP
[
ξf(ξ)UT (µxc − v′x)
]}}
, (32)
C solves : A2 = min
ξ∈Ξ
{
max
µ<0,v
{
2v
′
p− 2µC + EP
[
ξf(ξ)UT (µxc − v′x)
]}}
. (33)
Equations (30) and (31) are solved numerically by choice of η and then by choice of δ > 0,
w.
Consider first the pricing kernel, (29). The quantity Y (s,1L/U ,w, 1, δ) is the Cochrane
and Saa´-Requejo [2000] pricing kernel (in the absence of model uncertainty). The uncertainty
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averse investor distorts that pricing kernel, assigning greater marginal utility to states with
worse outcomes. In the special case of Ω = 1 (which corresponds to no aversion to model
uncertainty), ξ (s) = 1 in each state, the pricing kernel (29) reduces to the pricing kernel of
Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [2000] and the lower and upper good deal bounds (30) and (31)
coincide with those of Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [2000]. Similarly, when the loss function
Z(s,1L/U ,w, 1, δ) is independent of the state s, ξ (s) = 1 in each state and the solution
reduces once gain to the solution of Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [2000].
In the more general case of Ω strictly greater than one (so that the investor exhibits aver-
sion to model uncertainty) and mins
{
Z(s,1L/U ,w, 1, δ)
} 6= maxs {Z(s,1L/U ,w, 1, δ)} (so
that the investor is not indifferent amongst the different states of the world), ξ (s) decreases
when Z(s,1L/U ,w, 1, δ) increases. Since ξ (s) f (ξ (s)) is decreasing in ξ (s), the marginal
utility y (s) of the state s increases as Z(s,1L/U ,w, 1, δ) increases. Thus, the uncertainty
averse agent assigns higher marginal utility to states with larger losses. The maximization
(respectively, minimization) over δ, w for the lower good deal bound C (respectively, the
upper good deal bound C) then has the effect of minimizing the average weighted losses.
Notice that the Lagrange multipliers w have the interpretation of optimal hedging posi-
tions for the focus asset in the basis assets. This property allows us to interpret Y (s,1L/U ,w, 1, δ)
as the loss in state s after (optimally) hedging the focus asset and Z(s,1L/U ,w, 1, δ) as a
(post-hedge) loss function.
4.2 Case (2): The constraint EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
≤ A2 is slack
When EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
≤ A2 is slack, the good deal bounds reduce to the arbitrage bounds (that is,
those enforceable by sub- or super-replication). In particular, since the infimum (respectively,
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supremum) over ξ in the case of the lower (respectively, upper) good deal bound becomes
irrelevant, we solve
C = inf
y
{
EP[yxc] such that EP[yx] = p, y ≥ 0
}
, and
C = sup
y
{
EP[yxc] such that EP[yx] = p, y ≥ 0
}
, (34)
the solution of which can always be obtained numerically (see Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo
[2000]) since it is a linear program. We denote by CArb(1L/U) the respective arbitrage bound.
The arbitrage bound CArb(1L/U) is the good deal bound if the implied pricing kernel is such
that the constraint EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
≤ A2 is slack. To check, we solve
min
ξ∈Ξ
{
min
y
{
EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
such that CArb(1L/U) = EP[yxc], EP[yx] = p and y ≥ 0
}}
. (35)
If the minimized objective in (35) is less than A2, then CArb(1L/U) is the good deal bound.
Otherwise, the constraint is binding and case (1) is the relevant one. The solution is sum-
marized below, with v a Nb - dimensional vector, the Lagrange multipliers on the constraint
EP [yx] = p.
Proposition 9 When EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
≤ A2 is slack, the investor’s marginal utility in state s is
y(s) = ξ(s)f(ξ(s))Y (s, 1, v, µ, 1), (36)
where the worst-case distortion ξ and the Lagrange multipliers β(s) on ξ(s)f (ξ(s)) ≥ 0 are
given in Proposition 4, with the utility of terminal wealth U (V ) replaced by −Z(s, 1, v, µ, 1).
The solution to (35) is
max
v,µ
{
2v
′
p− 2µCArb(1L/U) + max
η
{
S∑
s=1
P(s)
[
−
(
1 + Ωg(ξ(s))
)(
Z(s, 1, v, µ, 1) + β(s)
)]}}
. (37)
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Equivalently, if
A2 > min
ξ∈Ξ
{
max
v,µ
{
2v
′
p− 2µCArb(1L/U) + EP[ξf(ξ)UT (µxc − v′x)]
}}
, (38)
then C (or respectively, C) equals the lower (or upper) arbitrage bound CArb(1L/U).
Problem (37) is solved numerically by choice of η and then by choice of v, µ.
Similarly to case (1), the uncertainty averse agent assigns higher marginal utility to
states with larger losses. Unlike case (1), however, the Lagrange multipliers v do not have
the interpretation of optimal hedges for the focus asset. Instead, the optimal hedges w
enforce the arbitrage bounds in (34) and can be computed explicitly by solving the dual to
the linear program. Specifically, w solves
max
w
w
′
p such that w
′
x(s) ≤ xc(s), for each state s, s = 1, . . . , S, (39)
for the lower bound (for the upper bound, replace max by min and ≤ by ≥).
To conclude this subsection, we reemphasize the intuition of the “No Good Deals”
methodology. Interpreting A2 as the target level of a reward-for-risk measure (a Sharpe
ratio or certainty equivalent), the “No Good Deals” methodology computes lower and upper
good deals bounds which either (1) achieve the target level of the reward-for-risk measure
under the worst-case likelihood, or (2) are the arbitrage bounds CArb(1L/U) when the target
level cannot be achieved. Furthermore, by analogy with (35) and (38), the minimum level
of the restriction on the pricing kernel A?2 (see equation (26)) has the dual representation
A?2 = min
ξ∈Ξ
{
max
v
{
2v
′
p + EP
[
ξf (ξ)UT
(
−v′x
)]}}
. (40)
Thus, A?2 is the maximum reward-for-risk available under the worst-case measure from trad-
ing in the basis assets. The restriction A2 ≥ A?2 can then be interpreted as the requirement
that the target reward-for-risk exceeds that available from trading in the basis assets alone.
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4.3 Good deal bounds under exponential and CRRA utility
We derive the restrictions on the pricing kernel for exponential and for CRRA utility in
Appendix B. Similarly, to the dual utility function UT (V ), define the dual utility functions
UE(V ) ≡ − exp(−V −1) and UCRRA(V ) ≡ −(max(−V, 0))1−γ/(γ(1−1/γ)1−γ) and similarly
to (27) and (28), define Y E(s,1L/U ,w, ϕ, δ), Z
E(s,1L/U ,w, ϕ, δ) and Y
CRRA(s,1L/U ,w, ϕ, δ),
ZCRRA(s,1L/U ,w, ϕ, δ) for exponential and CRRA utility, respectively, as
Y E(s,1L/U ,w, ϕ, δ) ≡ exp
((
−1L/U (ϕxc(s)−w
′
x(s))
δ
)
− 1
)
,
ZE(s,1L/U ,w, ϕ, δ) ≡ Y E(s,1L/U ,w, ϕ, δ) = −UE
(
1L/U
(ϕxc(s)−w′x(s))
δ
)
, (41)
Y CRRA(s,1L/U ,w, ϕ, δ) ≡ 1
(1− 1/γ)−γ
(
max
[
−1L/U (ϕxc(s)−w
′
x(s))
δ
, 0
])−γ
,
ZCRRA(s,1L/U ,w, ϕ, δ) ≡ −UCRRA
(
1L/U
(ϕxc(s)−w′x(s))
δ
)
. (42)
The solution to the good deals problem under exponential and CRRA utility is similar (full
details are in Appendix B) to that given in Propositions 8 and 9, except that
(1) Y and Z are replaced by Y E and ZE or by Y CRRA and ZCRRA, respectively;
(2) UT (truncated quadratic) is replaced by UE (exponential) or UCRRA (CRRA);
(3) the factors 1/2 and 2 in (30), (31), (32), (33), (37) and (38) are replaced by 1.
Notice that, the investor with exponential utility assigns greater weight to the tails of the loss
distribution compared to the truncated quadratic utility case. In particular, while for the
latter, the loss function Z computes the squared deviation from zero profit, for the former,
the loss function ZE computes the exponential deviation. Thus, the loss functions inherit
the structure of the utility function used to derive the restriction on the pricing kernel. In
particular, as we noted in Propositions 8 and 9, the negative of the loss functions Z, ZE
and ZCRRA take the role of the utility of terminal wealth U (V ) in computing the good deal
bounds. Just as U (V ) is concave, so Z, ZE and ZCRRA are convex.
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This convexity property enables us to show that the impact of model uncertainty on the
good deal bounds depends on the dispersion in the loss function Z across the S possible
states of the world. To make the argument more concrete, define
F
(
Zadj
) ≡ (1 + Ωg (ξ))Zadj, where Zadj ≡ Z + β.
Notice that Z can refer to either Z(s,1L/U ,w, 1, δ) or Z(s, 1,v, µ, 1) (or Z
E or ZCRRA) and
that g(ξ) depends on Zadj through ξ. It is straightforward (the calculations are similar to
the proof of Proposition 5) to verify that F
′′
(Zadj) ≥ 0 and F ′′′(Zadj) ≤ 0. By a Taylor
expansion with exact remainder:
EP[F (Zadj)] = EP[Z] +
1
2
S∑
s=1
P(s)[(Zadj − EP[Zadj])2F ′′(Zadj ?), or
EP[F (Zadj)] = EP[Z] +
1
2
VarP[Zadj]F ′′(EP[Zadj])
+
1
6
S∑
s=1
P(s)[(Zadj − EP[Zadj])3F ′′′(Zadj ??), (43)
for some Zadj ? and Zadj ??. Now comparing with (30), (31) and (37), we see the sense in
which a wide dispersion in Z increases, in magnitude, the difference between good deal
bounds in the presence of model uncertainty and in its absence. In the latter case, good
deal bounds depend only upon EP[Z(s,1L/U ,w, 1, δ)] (or EP[Z(s, 1,v, µ, 1)] in determining if
EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
≤ A2 is slack), but in the presence of model uncertainty, they depend upon higher
moments. Ceteris paribus, the larger the variance of (and/or the more negatively skewed)
Z(s,1L/U ,w, 1, δ), the wider the good deal bounds become. Similar comments apply in
making lower, the solution to problem (37). When EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
≤ A2 is slack (case (2)), the
good deal bounds can widen out no more and are equal to the arbitrage bounds CArb(1L/U).
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4.4 General properties of the good deal bounds
In this subsection, we develop some general properties of the good deal bounds. All these
properties are equally applicable to good deal bounds constructed from restrictions on the
pricing kernel in (24), (B.2) or (B.4).
Proposition 10 (a) Good deal bounds in the presence of model uncertainty are never
narrower than those in its absence.
(b) As either A2 increases or Ω increases, the lower good deal bound C is non-increasing
and the upper good deal bound C is non-decreasing.
Property (a) is intuitive: Since the investor can always choose the reference model P as the
worst-case model, the no good deals - no bad models good deal bounds must be at least as
wide as the traditional good deal bounds (i.e. in the absence of model uncertainty). Similarly,
as the restriction on the pricing kernel is relaxed (A2 increases) or the investor becomes more
averse to model uncertainty (Ω increases), the good deal bounds widen (until they reach the
arbitrage bounds).
For the following, let u denote an arbitrary Nb - dimensional vector.
Proposition 11 Let λ be a positive constant. If the lower and upper good deal bounds for
a focus payoff xc are C and C, respectively, with corresponding optimal hedges w and w,
then the lower and upper good deal bounds for a focus payoff λxc + u
′
x are λC + u
′
p and
λC + u
′
p, respectively, with corresponding optimal hedges λw + u and λw + u.
Corollary 12 Consider a focus payoff of the form u
′
x. Then the lower and upper good deal
bounds coincide and are both equal to u
′
p, and the optimal hedges are u.
Thus, the good deal bounds satisfy linearity with respect to adding portfolios of basis assets
and homogeneity with respect to positive multiples of the focus asset payoff. Furthermore,
as shown in Corollary 12, redundant assets are priced exactly at their replication cost.
Proposition 13 shows that the good deal bounds satisfy also a dominance property.
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Proposition 13 Consider two focus assets, A and B, with payoffs xAc and x
B
c , respectively,
with corresponding lower and upper good deal bounds CA, C
A
, CB and C
B
. If xAc (s) ≤ xBc (s)
for each state s, and the good deal bounds are computed using the same basis assets, then
CA ≤ CB and CA ≤ CB. (44)
The last three results are direct counterparts of the properties (see Hodges [1998]) of good
deal bounds in the absence of model uncertainty.
5 Estimating the Ω parameter and the choice of A2
In this section, we describe a procedure for estimating the degree of uncertainty aversion,
Ω, and discuss the choice of A2. The methodology for estimating Ω is based on the error
detection probability methodology of Hansen and Sargent [2008], Anderson et al. [2003] and
Maenhout [2004]. In particular, we choose Ω so that the maximum reward-for-risk achievable
under the worst-case likelihood is statistically indistinguishable from the maximum reward-
for-risk under the reference model. While some investors or financial institutions may exhibit
more uncertainty aversion than others, in this paper we follow the (conservative) recommen-
dations of Hansen and Sargent [2008], Anderson et al. [2003] and Maenhout [2004] and choose
Ω such that the error detection probability is between 20% and 10%. Ω is computed from
a historical data-set of asset prices, making the parameter Ω context-specific, with different
data-sets or different assets leading to different estimates of Ω.
Consider A? 2 in equations (26) and (40). A? 2 is the maximum reward-for-risk available
from trading in the basis assets under the worst-case model and solves
A? 2(Ω) ≡ A? 2 = max
v
{
2v
′
p + max
α
{
S∑
s=1
P(s)
[
−
(
1 + Ωg(ξ(s))
)(
Z(s, 1,v, 0, 1) + β(s)
)]}}
,
(45)
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where β(s) and ξ(s) are defined as in problem (37) but replacing Z(s, 1,v, µ, 1) by Z(s, 1,v, 0, 1).
Given an estimate of Ω, we can solve (45) numerically for A? 2. To estimate Ω, we search
numerically for the value of Ω which makes the solution to problem (45) statistically difficult
to distinguish (at the chosen error detection probability) from the solution to the equivalent
problem setting ξ (s) ≡ 1
A?NoMU 2 ≡ max
v
{
2v
′
p +
S∑
s=1
P(s)
[
−
(
Z(s, 1,v, 0, 1)
)]}
. (46)
We solve problems (45) and (46) using historical data, setting the number of states S equal
to the number of available observations J and assigning equal probabilities to each state
P(s) = 1/J . We bootstrap the historical data, K times, by repeatedly sampling from the
data with replacement. Sampling with replacement means that sometimes we sample a
given historical data point more than once and sometimes not at all. For each bootstrapped
sample, we compute the solution to problem (46). We sort the K solutions into order and
select the solution corresponding to the chosen error detection probability. We then set Ω to
be that value which gives the same solution to problem (45) for the full (non-bootstrapped)
historical sample. Note that when solving problems (45) and (46), we work with returns (i.e.
we divide each historical observed price by its price at the preceding time point). Hence,
Z(s, 1,v, 0, 1) now reflects “payoffs in return form”. 10
We now turn our attention to choosing the bound A2 in the constraint EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
≤ A2:
There are different alternatives:
10As an alternative, we could work with excess (i.e. over and above the risk-free rate) returns which may
be better conditioned. If we denote the excess returns by R, then problem (45) can be rewritten:
min
ξ∈Ξ
{
min
y
{
EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
such that EP[yR] = 0, y ≥ 0 and EP[y] = 1/(1 +Rf )
}}
, (47)
where Rf is the average one period risk-free rate. We need the extra condition EP[y] = 1/(1 + Rf ) to
normalise y - without it, the minimizing value of y is zero. The problem is easily solved by analogy to
problems (45) and (46).
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(1) Choose A2 to be some margin over (or some multiple ≥ 1 of) either (a) A?NoMU 2 or
(b) A? 2 (with the former being more conservative).
(2) Choose A2 through the choice of an annualized Sharpe ratio hAnn.
Expanding upon the latter, Cˇerny´ [2003] shows that the certainty equivalent CE of any utility
function UG(V ) and its coefficient of absolute risk aversion CARA(UG(V0)) are linked, under
Assumptions 1 and 2, to investment opportunities, over a time period ∆t, with a small per
period Sharpe ratio hPerP by:
CARA(UG(V0)) CE ≈ 1
2
h 2PerP =
1
2
h 2Ann∆t. (48)
Hence, a bound on CE ≤ C in equation (24) is approximately the same as a bound on
EP[ y
2
ξf(ξ)
] ≤
(
1
1−(CARA(U(V0))C)
)2
≈
(
1
1− 1
2
h 2PerP
)2
≈ 1 + h 2PerP = 1 + h 2Ann∆t, by a Taylor
expansion. This relates the bound on EP[ y
2
ξf(ξ)
] to a bound on the annualised Sharpe ratio
hAnn. In our numerical results in Section 7, we (following Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [2000])
set A2 = (1+h2Ann∆t)/(1+r)
2, for a time period ∆t years, where r is the per period risk-free
interest-rate.
In choosing hAnn, we note that Hansen and Sargent [2008], Anderson et al. [2003] and
Maenhout [2004] find that, for very plausible error detection probabilities, model uncertainty
can account for half or more of the excess return on equity markets.11 The presence of model
uncertainty can thus reduce the maximal admissible Sharpe ratio hAnn of Cochrane and Saa´-
Requejo [2000]. Instead, we interpret hAnn as the maximal Sharpe ratio achievable under
11The impact of model uncertainty on asset returns has also been studied by Epstein and Wang [1994],
Chen and Epstein [2002], Uppal and Wang [2003], Cao et al. [2005], Barillas et al. [2009] and Anderson et al.
[2009].
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the worst-case measure. In our numerical results, we will choose12 various values of hAnn
between 1/3 and 0.5.
6 Multiple time periods
The previous analysis considered a one period problem. In this section, we extend the results
to a multi-period setting, focusing on the two period case. There are three dates, indexed
by t = 0, 1, 2. At time t = 0, the investor takes a position in the focus asset, which pays xc
at time t = 2. Time t = 1 is an intermediate rebalancing time, when the investor can adjust
her hedging portfolio in the basis assets and update her valuation of the focus asset. Denote
the time t = 0, 1 conditional expectation under the reference measure P by EPt , and the time
t = 1, 2 pricing kernel and worst-case distortion by yt and ξt, respectively. Finally, denote
the time t = 0, 1 lower and upper good deal bounds by Ct and Ct, respectively. With this
notation, the two period problem (for the lower bound) is
C0 = inf
ξ1,ξ2
{
inf
y1,y2
{
EP0 [y1y2xc] such that EP0 [y1p1] = p0, y1 ≥ 0,EP0
[
y21
ξ1f(ξ1)
]
≤ A20,
EP1 [y2x] = p1 ∀=1, y2 ≥ 0,EP1
[
y22
ξ2f(ξ2)
]
≤ A21 ∀=1
}
such that EP0 [ξ1] = 1, ξ1 > 0, ξ1f(ξ1) ≥ 0,EP1 [ξ2] = 1, ξ2 > 0, ξ2f(ξ2) ≥ 0
}
, (49)
where =1 is the information set at time t = 1. Thus, in a two period setting, the initial
lower good deal bound imposes sequential constraints on the pricing kernels at each date.
12In 2000, the then chairman of Barclays bank said he wanted its investment banking arm to achieve a
20% target return on equity (when risk-free interest-rates were around 5% and the volatility of Barclays
shares was around 25%) - which could be interpreted as implying he wanted it to achieve an ex-post Sharpe
ratio of (20 − 5)/25 = 0.6. Choosing hAnn = 0.6 is then equivalent to seeking to achieve his target, even
under the worst-case likelihood.
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Applying the Law of Iterated Expectations (see the detailed proof in Cochrane and Saa´-
Requejo [2000]), we can rewrite equation (49) as two (sequential) one period problems
C1 (s1) = inf
ξ2
{
inf
y2
{
EP1 [y2xc] such that EP1 [y2x2] = p1, y2 ≥ 0,EP1
[
y22
ξ2f(ξ2)
]
≤ A21
}
,
such that EP1 [ξ2] = 1, ξ2 > 0, ξ2f(ξ2) ≥ 0
}
C0 = inf
ξ1
{
inf
y1
{
EP0 [y1C1] such that EP0 [y1x1] = p0, y1 ≥ 0,EP0
[
y21
ξ1f(ξ1)
]
≤ A20
}
,
such that EP0 [ξ1] = 1, ξ1 > 0, ξ1f(ξ1) ≥ 0
}
, (50)
where equation (50) takes the solution to the time 1 problem as given. For the upper bound
C0, we solve equation (49) or (50) with the infimum operator replaced by the supremum
operator. Notice that this separation of the non-sequential problem (49) into two sequential
problems is possible because the constraints on the pricing kernels and worst-case distortions
are applied sequentially and the pricing kernels preclude arbitrage opportunities. As pointed
out in Hansen and Sargent [2008] and Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini [2006], the
multiplier problem (11) enforces commitment on the part of the uncertainty averse agent,
making it possible to express the restrictions on the pricing kernel recursively. Finally,
notice that, with this formulation, we can easily extend the no good deals methodology to
accommodate more than two periods.
Consider now solving for the optimal hedging portfolios that achieve the good deal bounds
at each date. Denote by wt the optimal hedging portfolio at time t = 0, 1. Then, similarly
to the good deal bounds, the hedging strategy solves the sequential13 problems
13For illustration, we implicitly assume that the constraints EP0
[
y21
ξ1f(ξ1)
]
≤ A20 and EP1
[
y22
ξ2f(ξ2)
]
≤ A21 bind.
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C1 (s1) = max
δ1(s1)>0,w1(s1)
{
w
′
1(s1)p1(s1)−
1
2
δ1(s1)A
2
1 (51)
+ max
η1
{
S∑
s2=1
P(s2)
[
−1
2
δ1(s1)
(
1 + Ωg(ξ2(s2))
)(
Z(s2,1L/U ,w1, 1, δ1(s1)) + β1(s2)
)]}}
C0 = max
δ0>0,w0
{
w
′
0p0 −
1
2
δ0A
2
0
+ max
η0
{
S∑
s1=1
P(s1)
[
−1
2
δ0
(
1 + Ωg(ξ1(s1))
)(
Z(s1,1L/U ,w0, 1, δ0) + β0(s1)
)]}}
.
Let ηˆ1 be the optimal value of η1 and δˆ1 (s1) the optimal value of δ1 (s1) in (51). Using the
first-order conditions, problem (51) reduces to
C1 (s1) = max
w1(s1)
{
w
′
1(s1)p1(s1)− δˆ1(s1)A21
}
, where
A21 = A
2
1 +
S∑
s2=1,ξ2=ξcrit
[
1
2
(1− ξcrit)Ωηˆ1Ψ
]
.
Then
C0 = max
δ0>0,w0
{
w
′
0p0 −
1
2
δA20
+ max
η0

S∑
s1=1
P(s1)
−1
2
δ0 (1 + Ωg(ξ1(s1)))

max
[
Rˆ1(s1), 0
]
δ0
2 + β0(s1)



 ,
where
Rˆ1(s1) ≡ w′0p1(s1)− C1(s1) = − min
w1(s1)
{(
w
′
1(s1)−w
′
0
)
p1(s1)− δˆ1(s1)A21
}
. (52)
Using the intuition of Section 4.3, model uncertainty has a larger impact on the time 0
good deal bounds if there is more dispersion in the values of max
[
Rˆ1 (s1) , 0
]
. Assume
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(for intuition purposes) that δˆ1 (s1)A
2
1 is relatively insensitive
14 to the realization of the
state s1. Then greater dispersion in max
[
Rˆ1 (s1) , 0
]
corresponds to greater dispersion
in
(
w
′
1(s1)−w′0
)
p1(s1). Conversely, the impact of model uncertainty is reduced when(
w
′
1(s1)−w′0
)
p1(s1) becomes less sensitive to the realization of the state s1 and, in par-
ticular, the impact of model uncertainty on the time 0 good deal bounds is smallest when
w0 = w1 (s1) for all states s1 = 1, . . . , S. The latter corresponds to a static hedging strat-
egy,15 which keeps the hedging portfolio constant across time and shock realizations.
More generally, compare two strategies for hedging the position in a focus asset:
(1) a dynamic hedging strategy in the basis assets, with rebalancing allowed at the inter-
mediate time t = 1
(2) a static hedging strategy in the basis assets, with the positions chosen at time t = 0
maintained at time t = 1.
Clearly, an investor following the first strategy can always choose to maintain the position
in the hedging portfolio at time t = 1, so dynamic hedging is always weakly better than the
static hedging strategy. Thus, the good deal bounds under the dynamic hedging strategy
are never wider (even in the absence of model uncertainty) than the bounds under the static
hedging strategy. As the investor becomes more uncertainty averse, however, the good deal
bounds widen under both strategies and approach the arbitrage bounds. Thus, the distance
(and, hence, the benefit to dynamic hedging) between the good deal bounds under dynamic
and static hedging decreases as the investor becomes more uncertainty averse.
14If EP1
[
y22
ξ2f(ξ2)
]
≤ A21 is slack in state s1, then from (39), C1 (s1) is of the form w
′
1(s1)p1(s1) which is
effectively, in the context of (52), equivalent to setting δˆ1 (s1)A
2
1 to zero.
15Carr et al. [1998] is a comprehensive reference on static hedging strategies with a number of examples.
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7 Numerical examples
In this section, we consider two numerical examples of computing the good deal bounds
and the associated hedging portfolios. The first example values Arrow-Debreu securities in
a three state, one period model with a risk-free bond and a defaultable bond as the basis
assets. The second values options on a non-traded asset.
7.1 Defaultable bond
Consider an economy with two basis assets, a defaultable bond and a risk-free bond. At time
1, there are three possible states of the world, labelled “good”, “poor” and “armageddon”.
The defaultable bond has a time 0 price of 1 and a payoff at time 1 equal to 1.2, 0.6 and
0 in states “good”, “poor” and “armageddon” respectively. The “poor” and “armageddon”
states are states in which the issuer of the defaultable bond defaults and the holder of the
bond receives either 60% (partial recovery) or 0% (zero recovery) of the time 0 price. The
risk-free bond has a time 0 price of 1 and a payoff at time 1 equal to 1 in all three states.
To illustrate our theoretical analysis, we simulate a data-set with 2000 data points. The
defaultable bond pays 1.2, 0.6 and 0 on 1700, 200 and 100 dates in the sample, respectively.
Hence, the probability, under P, of states “good”, “poor” and “armageddon” occurring are
set at 0.85, 0.1 and 0.05 respectively. Given the simulated historical data-set, we use the
bootstrap procedure of Section 5 to estimate Ω. We bootstrap the data-set 65000 times,
and, for the 80% confidence level, we find Ω = 1.51. In Table 1, we report also the estimate
of Ω for simulated data-sets with 500, 1000, 4000 and 8000, keeping the same probabilities of
the three states. We see that as the length of the simulated data-set increases, the estimate
of Ω increases, implying greater model uncertainty.
We consider three Arrow-Debreu securities as the focus assets. In particular, Arrow-
Debreu security Fj, for j ∈ {good, poor, armageddon} pays one dollar if state j is realized.
Notice that Farmageddon is a catastrophe insurance contract. It is straightforward to verify
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(or by solving (34)) that the lower and upper arbitrage bounds for the three focus assets are
2/3, 5/6 (Fgood), 0, 1/3 (Fpoor) and 0, 1/6 (Farmageddon) respectively. We set the maximum
Sharpe ratio bound hAnn equal to 1/3. In Table 2, we report the lower and upper good deal
bounds, C and C, for different values of Ω. Note that Ω = 1 is the no model uncertainty
case. As Ω increases, the good deal bounds widen and the values of C and C get closer to
the respective lower and upper arbitrage bounds and, for Ω = 8, the good deal bounds equal
the arbitrage bounds.
Consider now the catastrophe insurance contract, Farmageddon, in detail. In Table 3, we
report the lower C and upper C good deal bounds for different levels of uncertainty aversion,
as well as the optimal hedging positions in the two basis assets. The pricing kernel constraint
is slack when Ω = 8 for the lower bound and when Ω ∈ {4, 8} for the upper bound. For
these values of Ω, the good deal bounds correspond to the arbitrage bounds. The positions
in the defaultable bond and risk-free bond respectively (computed from equation (39)) which
enforce the lower and upper arbitrage bounds are 0, 0 and −5/6, 1.16 In Table 3, w1 and
w2 are the optimal hedges for the defaultable bond and risk-free bond respectively. We see
that, as the value of Ω changes, the optimal hedges w1 and w2 change significantly.
In Table 4, we focus just on the lower good deal bound and we consider a wider range of
values of Ω in order to see where the boundary lies between when the constraint EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
≤
A2 binds and when it is slack. We see that the boundary lies at a value of Ω of approximately
5.463. Values of Ω less than or equal to 5.4625 give a lower good deal bound where the
constraint binds and values of Ω greater than or equal to 5.46375 give a lower good deal
bound where the constraint is slack and hence the good deal bound is the arbitrage bound.
Notice that, since the nature of the good deal bounds is discontinuous, the optimal hedges
are discontinuous across the critical value of Ω = 5.46375.
16That is, the upper arbitrage bound 1/6 can be enforced by sellng 5/6 units of the defaultable bond and
buying one unit of the risk-free bond which costs, at time 0, a price of 1− 5/6 = 1/6 dollar while the lower
arbitrage bound is enforced by zero position in each basis asset.
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7.2 Options on non-traded asset
We now consider options written on a non-traded asset. This example is similar to one in
Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [2000] (p111-113) except, of course, we also consider the impact
of model uncertainty. There is a traded asset, labelled 1 whose price is denoted by S, and a
non-traded asset, labelled 2 whose value is denoted by V . The option (focus asset) payoff is
max(V −K, 0) for a call (respectively, max(K − V, 0) for a put), where K is a fixed strike.
We consider a European call with K = 65, a European call with K = 55 and a European
put with K = 65. The option maturity is 2 years. The traded asset 1 is is correlated (but
not perfectly) with the non-traded asset and can be used to partially hedge the option.
We model the underlying dynamics as double trinomial (a pyramid rather than a triangle)
with steps one month apart (24 steps over 2 years). At each time-step i (i = 0, 1, . . . , 23) of
the trinomial tree, when the price of the traded asset 1 is Si, the price can stay the same,
go up to Si exp(λ1σ1
√
dt) or down to Si exp(−λ1σ1
√
dt) where λ1 =
√
(3/2), σ1 = 0.25 (the
volatility). and dt = 2/24 (one month) is the time period corresponding to each step. The
correlation between log-changes in S and V is ρ (we set ρ = 0.8). When the value of the
non-traded asset 2 is Vi, the value can change to: Vi exp(λ2σ2
√
dt(
√
1− ρ2Z2 + ρZ1)) for
Z1 = −1, 0, 1 and Z2 = −1, 0, 1 and where λ2 =
√
(3/2), σ2 = 0.28 (the volatility). This
is a standard double trinomial tree construction. In the limit of small time-steps, this tree
construction will approximate S and V being jointly log-normal (but we will not be interested
in this small time-step limit - we regard the discrete-time dynamics above as specifying the
actual dynamics, rather than of being an approximation to some continuous-time dynamics).
The risk-free rate is 0.03 (expressed as a continuously-compounded rate). Traded asset
1 has an initial price of asset 20 and pays a dividend yield of 2% (expressed as a continuous
yield proportional to its price) or 0.02. We include a non-zero dividend yield to illustrate
that it is straightforward to do so - if asset 1 were a commodity, we could treat this as its
convenience yield. In the latter case, the non-traded asset 2 could be the value of something
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which gets embedded in a “real option” (new mine, new oil field or oil refinery project) which
we cannot trade but where we can (partially) hedge with an imperfectly correlated financial
asset. The initial value of non-traded asset 2 is 60.
We can trade in the basis assets (asset 1 and a one period risk-free bond) and rebalance
our hedges at the start of steps 0, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21 (not every step) i.e. we rebalance
every three months. There are two sources of incompleteness: The discrete-time hedging and
the fact that we can only hedge with a partially correlated traded asset. For illustration, we
suppose the excess return on asset 1 is 0.03 and that on the non-traded asset 2 is 0.04. We
then compute the probabilities in the double trinomial tree by requiring that they sum to
one and by matching each of the first two moments of S and V .
We use a maximum Sharpe ratio bound hAnn equal to 0.5. We consider different values of
the Ω parameter (16, 8, 4, 2, 1.75, 1.5, 1.25 and 1). The results are in Table 5, where we also
report the risk-neutral price (meaning with the excess returns set to zero but computed with
the same placements of tree nodes) and the Black and Scholes [1973] price (labelled BS) just
for illustration - neither of these prices has a real financial meaning here since one cannot
even trade the non-traded asset 2 (but the difference between the former and the latter would
give an idea of the discretization error if there were to be an interest in approximating joint
geometric Brownian motion by the double trinomial tree).
The lower and upper good deal bounds when there is no model uncertainty (labelled No
MU and computed by setting ξ ≡ 1) are, of course, the same as when Ω = 1 - in line with
our theoretical analysis. We observe that as Ω is increased, the good deal bounds widen - in
fact, in this example, changing Ω has a huge impact. For the call options, this may be partly
due to the fact that the lower and upper arbitrage bounds are very wide in this example -
namely, zero and infinity.
We now extend our analysis by considering American options which additionally give the
holder of the option the right to exercise at the same frequency as the hedge-rebalancing i.e.
at the start of steps 0, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21. We consider only the lower good deal bounds
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C (for simplicity, since these correspond to reservation prices for long positions - the upper
good deal bounds C (corresponding to reservation prices for short positions) are dependent
upon the exercise strategy of the option buyer). We assume that the American option is
exercised when the immediate exercise value exceeds the continuation value of the lower good
deal bound. The results are in Table 5 where we again report the risk-neutral price. Since
the non-traded asset 2 does not pay dividends, the risk-neutral prices of the American call
options are the same as their European counterparts. Defining the early exercise premium
to be the value of the relevant American option minus that of its European counterpart, we
see that the early exercise premia of the lower good deal bounds are substantial - even for
call options - and increase with increasing values of Ω. Indeed, for values of Ω ∈ {4, 8, 16},
it is optimal to immediately exercise the options (call, K = 55 and put, K = 65) which are
initially in-the-money.
It is intuitive that larger values of Ω (corresponding to greater model uncertainty) lead to
larger early exercise premia since, when the option is exercised, model uncertainty becomes
irrelevant. This incentivizes the uncertainty averse investor to exercise the option earlier.
Our results are significant in the context of real options since real options are often
American in nature.
8 Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we have described a new and practical approach to dealing with model un-
certainty in pricing securities or contingent claims. It is based on combining the “No Good
Deals” methodology of Cochrane and Saa´-Requejo [2000] with elements of the robustness
framework of Hansen and Sargent [2008] and of Maenhout [2004]. In an important stepping-
stone, we have introduced the notion of a model-uncertainty-induced utility function and
shown how model uncertainty increases an investor’s effective risk aversion. We have shown
how the impact of model uncertainty is to give greater weight (i.e. greater than the investor’s
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marginal utility) to states in which losses are relatively large. We have shown how static
hedging i.e. hedging an option by taking a static (“buy-and-hold”) position in other options
(as opposed to dynamic hedging with the underlying asset) may become a relatively attrac-
tive hedging strategy in the presence of model uncertainty. Uppal and Wang [2003] consider
the impact of multiple sources of model uncertainty on portfolio selection. As a possible fu-
ture extension of our work, it would be interesting to consider the impact of multiple sources
of model uncertainty (for example, different degrees of uncertainty in the estimates of the
drifts or volatilities of two different assets).
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Appendix A: Proofs of propositions
Proof of Proposition 3.
(1) follows from Jensen’s inequality applied to g(ξ), (2) follows since ξ(s) ≡ 1 in all states s
if Ω = 1. For (3), note that, for any b2 ≥ b1 and any a, exp(ab2) − (ab2) − 1 ≥ exp(ab1) −
(ab1) − 1, with equality only if a = 0 or b2 = b1. Applying this result with b = Ψ and
a = 1 + η/(U(V )− β(s)) gives part (3).
Proof of Proposition 4.
Introducing Lagrange multipliers α, β(s) ≥ 0 and $(s) ≥ 0, for each s, on the set of
constraints Ξ, the inner minimization in problem (13) becomes:
inf
ξ∈Ξ
{EP[ξf(ξ)U(V )]} = max
$(s)≥0,β(s)≥0,α
{min
ξ(s)
{
S∑
s=1
P(s)[ξ(s)f(ξ(s))U(V ) + α(ξ(s)− 1)
− β(s)ξ(s)f(ξ(s))−$(s)ξ(s)]}}. (A.1)
The first-order condition from taking partial derivatives with respect to ξ(s) in each state s
implies:
α−$(s) =
(
β(s)− U(V )
)
Ω(Ψ− log ξ(s)). (A.2)
Equation (A.2) enables us to solve for ξ(s). If U(V ) is the same in every state s and/or
Ψ = 0, then the only solution is α = 0, $(s) = β(s) = 0, ξ(s) = 1. So now let’s consider
opposing cases. We conjecture that the constraint ξ(s) > 0 is not binding which means we
could set $(s) = 0 for all s (we will check this later). We need β(s) ≥ 0 and ξ(s)f(ξ(s)) ≥ 0
for all s. If f(ξ(s)) > 0, then β(s) = 0 and we can solve for ξ(s) from (A.2), whereas if
f(ξ(s)) = 0 (which means ξ(s) = ξcrit), then β(s) > 0 but this implies that β(s) must be
such that (A.2) holds. This enables us to solve for ξ(s) and β(s) as in the statement of the
proposition, in terms of which
η ≡ α
ΩΨ
=
α
(1− Ω) for Ψ < 0 . (A.3)
(If Ψ = 0, the maximization over η is irrelevant). With these values of ξ(s), the condition
ξ(s) > 0 is automatically satisfied and hence $(s) ≡ 0 as conjectured.
Substituting from (A.2) implies that (A.1) can be re-written in the form of (14). Equation
(14), with ξ(s) and β(s) substituted, can be solved numerically by choice of η. To see what
values of η are possible, note that since Ψ ≤ 0, for ξ(s) ≥ 1, (Ψ− log ξ(s)) cannot be strictly
positive (and must be strictly negative if Ψ < 0). Since EP[ξ] =
∑S
s=1 P(s)ξ(s) = 1, ξ(s)
must be greater than or equal to 1 in at least one of the S possible states. Hence, α must be
less than or equal to zero (this is implied by the expression for ξ(s) if 1 ≤ ξ(s) < ξcrit and
by the expression for β(s) if ξ(s) = ξcrit). Hence, η ≥ 0. Actually, we can strengthen this
result. Since ξ(s) must be less than or equal to one in at least one state,
(
1 + η
U(V )
)
Ψ must
be less than or equal to zero in at least one state. Hence, η must be less than or equal to
−U(V ) for at least one state s - giving an upper bound. A similar argument gives a lower
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bound and hence (18). The requirement that α ≤ 0, η ≥ 0 implies (from (A.2)) that ξ(s) is
bounded below by exp(Ψ).
Proof of Proposition 5.
(i) follows since, by Jensen’s inequality, 1 + Ωg(ξ) ≥ 1, for all ξ. (ii) Differentiating UMU(V ):
UMU
′
(V ) =
(
Ω(1− ξ) ηˆΨ
(U(V )− β) +
(
1 + Ωg(ξ)
))
U
′
(V ) = ξf(ξ)U
′
(V ), (A.4)
after simplification (using (A.2)). Hence UMU
′
(V ) ≥ 0 since U ′(V ) ≥ 0. (iii) When U(V ) <
−ηˆ, ξ < 1 (from (15)), hence ξf(ξ) > 1 (from (10)). For (iv), differentiating (A.4):
UMU
′′
(V ) = ξf(ξ)U
′′
(V ) + (U
′
(V ))2ΩΨ2
ηˆ2
(U(V )− β)3 ξ. (A.5)
Then note β ≥ 0 and (by Assumption 2) U(V ) ≤ 0.
Proof of Proposition 6.
For simplicity, within this proof, we interpret V0 as forward initial wealth and normalise
EP[y] = 1 - but nothing depends on this normalization. ξ is the worst-case distortion given
by (14) i.e. as in Proposition 4 evaluated at ηˆ, the maximizing value of η.
We introduce a Lagrange multiplier λ ≡ λ(s) in state s, for each s = 1, . . . , S and re-
express (22) in the form: supV {EP[UMU(V )−λ(yV −V0)]}. Differentiating with respect to V
and using the first part of Proposition 5 gives the first order condition: 2β(V −V )ξf(ξ) = λy
and the constraint EP[yV ] = V0 then implies: V0 = EP[y]V − λβEP[ y
2
2ξf(ξ)
]. Hence, solving for λ:
λ = (2β(V −V0))/EP[ y2ξf(ξ) ]. Subsituting for V , supV {EP[UMU(V )]}, subject to the constraint
EP[yV ] = V0, is:
sup
V
{EP[UMU(V )]} = EP[−ξf(ξ)β 1
4
λ2
β
2
y2
(ξf(ξ))2
] = −β (V − V0)
2
EP[ y2
ξf(ξ)
]
. (A.6)
Now we solve for the certainty equivalent CE. From (22),
−β(V − (V0 + CE))2 = −β (V − V0)
2
EP[ y2
ξf(ξ)
]
. (A.7)
Taking the square root (we need the positive root) gives (23).
Proof of Proposition 8.
We focus on the lower good deal bound C (C is similar and omitted). Introducing Lagrange
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multipliers δ > 0, w (a Nb - dimensional vector), α, β(s) ≥ 0 and $(s) ≥ 0, for each s, we
can re-express (25) as:
C = max
$(s)≥0,β(s)≥0,α
{min
ξ(s)
{max
δ>0,w
{ min
y(s)≥0
{
S∑
s=1
P(s)[y(s)xc(s)−w′(y(s)x(s)− p)
+
1
2
δ(
y(s)2
ξ(s)f(ξ(s))
− A2)]}}
+
S∑
s=1
P(s)[
1
2
α(ξ(s)− 1)− 1
2
δβ(s)ξ(s)f(ξ(s))− 1
2
$(s)ξ(s)]}}. (A.8)
The first-order condition obtained by taking partial derivatives with respect to y(s) in each
state s and, if necessary, enforcing the condition y(s) ≥ 0 (we say if necessary because this
constraint may or may not bind) implies (29) (we have anticipated the corresponding form
for the case of the upper good deal bound and introduced 1L/U accordingly). Substituting
for y(s) and interchanging the orders of max and min which is justified since the minimand
over ξ(s) is convex and the maximands are concave, we get:
C = max
δ>0,w
{ max
$(s)≥0,β(s)≥0,α
{min
ξ(s)
{w′p− 1
2
δA2
+
S∑
s=1
P(s)[−1
2
δξ(s)f(ξ(s))Z(s,1L/U ,w, 1, δ) +
1
2
α(ξ(s)− 1)
− 1
2
δβ(s)ξ(s)f(ξ(s))− 1
2
$(s)ξ(s)]}}}. (A.9)
The first-order condition from taking partial derivatives with respect to ξ(s) in each state s
implies:
α−$(s) = δ
(
Z(s,1L/U ,w, 1, δ) + β(s)
)
Ω(Ψ− log ξ(s)). (A.10)
The rest of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 4 - in fact, the solution can almost
be read off (identifying Z(s,1L/U ,w, 1, δ) here with −U(V ) there). As in Proposition 4,
$(s) = 0 and we identify η ≡ α/(δΩΨ).
Equation (32) (similarly, (33)) is derived by taking a step back to the first part of (A.9),
removing the Lagrange multipliers α, β(s) and $(s) and then rearranging (cf (3)).
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Proof of Proposition 9.
Introducing Lagrange multipliers v (a Nb - dimensional vector), µ, α, β(s) ≥ 0 and $(s) ≥ 0,
for each s, problem (35) is equivalent to:
max
$(s)≥0,β(s)≥0,α
{min
ξ(s)
{max
v,µ
{ min
y(s)≥0
{
S∑
s=1
P(s)[
y(s)2
ξ(s)f(ξ(s))
+ 2µ(y(s)xc(s)− CArb(1L/U))
− 2v′(yx(s)− p)]}}+
S∑
s=1
P(s)[α(ξ(s)− 1)− β(s)ξ(s)f(ξ(s))−$(s)ξ(s)]}}. (A.11)
The rest of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 4 (identifying Z(s, 1,v, µ, 1) here with
−U(V ) there) and Proposition 8. Again, $(s) = 0 and we identify η ≡ α/(ΩΨ).
Proof of Proposition 10.
Part (a) follows because (by Jensen’s inequality) 1+Ωg(ξ(s)) = 1+Ω(ξ(s)− log ξ(s)−1) ≥ 1
for all ξ(s). Part (b): The statement concerning A2 is obvious from (25) while that concerning
Ω is proven in the same way as part (3) of Proposition 3.
Proofs of Propositions 11, 12 and 13.
These are easily proven by substituting into (30), (31) and (37).
Appendix B: Exponential and CRRA utility functions
In this appendix, we detail the analysis of good deal bounds for the cases of exponential and
CRRA utility functions (as opposed to the (truncated) quadratic utility function case which
we have hitherto focussed on).
The extension of Proposition 6 is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition B.1 (1) For the case of exponential utility, U(V ) = −β exp(−BV ), with
constant absolute risk aversion B > 0, the certainty equivalent is
CE =
1
CARA(U(V0))
EP
[
y log
( y
ξf(ξ)
)]
, and furthermore (B.1)
CE ≤ C ⇐⇒ EP
[
y log
( y
ξf(ξ)
)] ≤ CARA(U(V0))C. (B.2)
(2) For the case of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility with CRRA coefficient
γ > 1, U(V ) = β V
1−γ
1−γ , the certainty equivalent is
CE = V0
(
EP
[
y
( y
ξf(ξ)
)−1
γ
]) γ
1−γ − V0, and furthermore (B.3)
CE ≤ C ⇐⇒ EP
[
y
( y
ξf(ξ)
)−1
γ
]
≤
(
1 + CARA(U(V0))
C
γ
) 1
γ
−1
. (B.4)
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In deriving the associated good deal bounds, we replace the constraint EP
[
y2
ξf(ξ)
]
≤ A2
by (for exponential) EP
[
y log
(
y
ξf(ξ)
)]
≤ A2 or by (for CRRA) EP
[
y
(
y
ξf(ξ)
)−1
γ
]
≤ A2.
Propositions 8 and 9, and more specifically equations (30), (31), (32), (33), (37), (38),
(40), (45) and (46), hold in their entirety provided: Y and Z are replaced by Y E and ZE (for
exponential) or by Y CRRA and ZCRRA (for CRRA), respectively; the dual utility function
UT is replaced by UE(V ) or UCRRA(V ); and the factors 1/2 and 2 are replaced by 1.
So as examples, for exponential utility, the analogs of (30) and (46), respectively, read
C = max
δ>0,w
{
w
′
p− δA2+
max
η
{
S∑
s=1
P(s)
[
−δ
(
1 + Ωg(ξ(s))
)(
ZE(s,1L/U ,w, 1, δ) + β(s)
)]}}
,
A?NoMU 2 ≡ max
v
{
v
′
p +
S∑
s=1
P(s)
[
−
(
ZE(s, 1,v, 0, 1)
)]}
.
The latter means that the estimate of Ω and the choice of A2 also depend upon the
choice of utility function. In choosing A2, the same alternatives are available but there is
a particularly simply way for the exponential utility case via the choice of an annualized
exponential (Hodges [1998]) Sharpe ratio hEAnn because then equation (48) holds exactly, for
an arbitrary time period ∆t years - indeed Hodges [1998] takes that to be the definition of
hEAnn. Hence, we can set A
2 = hE 2Ann∆t. Furthermore, for normally distributed returns and in
the limit of small time periods, Hodges [1998] and Cˇerny´ [2003] show that the exponential
Sharpe ratio hEAnn and the (standard) Sharpe ratio hAnn coincide.
Finally, we stress that the arbitrage bounds in (34) and both the statements and the
proofs of Propositions 11, 12 and 13 are unaffected by the choice of utility function.
Appendix C: Equity premium puzzle
In this appendix, we show that our model uncertainty framework, whilst differing from
those of Hansen and Sargent [2008], Barillas et al. [2009] and Maenhout [2004], is like theirs,
potentially able to explain the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott [1985].
We consider two one period economies - in the first economy, the representative agent
has no model uncertainty (quantities are denoted with a superscript NoMU) and has CRRA
utility U(c) = β c
1−γ
1−γ and, in the second economy, the representative agent seeks robustness
against model uncertainty but is otherwise identical. Mean consumption growth is denoted
by µc and the volatility of consumption growth is denoted by σc. Consumption, at time 0, is
denoted c0. Consumption c1 at time 1 can take on one of three values: c0 exp(µcdt+λσc
√
dt),
c0 exp(µcdt) or c0 exp(µcdt − λσc
√
dt), where λ =
√
(3/2) and dt = 1 (i.e. we consider a
time period of one year). The one period risk-free returns are denoted by RNoMUf and Rf .
There is a stock, with volatility σS, whose price is assumed to be perfectly correlated with
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Table C.1: Excess returns and risk-free rates for different values of γ and Ω
γ Ω σ(m) σ(ξf(ξ)m) RNoMUf − 1 Rf − 1 ERNoMU ER
2 2 6.21 7.76 3.52 3.44 1.33 1.66
2 8 6.21 25.21 3.52 2.55 1.33 5.36
2 16 6.21 49.82 3.52 1.31 1.33 10.47
5 2 14.83 20.68 7.79 7.14 3.30 4.58
5 8 14.83 81.83 7.79 0.48 3.30 17.02
consumption. Its time 0 price is normalised to 1 and at time 1 it can take on one of three
values: exp(µcdt + λσc
√
dt)(σS/σc), exp(µcdt)
(σS/σc) or exp(µcdt − λσc
√
dt)(σS/σc). Standard
results (Cochrane [2005]) imply that, for the first economy
ERNoMU ≡ EP[RNoMU]−RNoMUf = −RNoMUf Cov(m,R) and RNoMUf =
1
EP[m]
, (C.1)
where m ≡ β U
′
(c1)
U ′ (c0)
= β
(
c1
c0
)−γ
denotes the pricing kernel. For the second economy,
ER ≡ EP[R]−Rf = −RfCov(ξf(ξ)m,R) and Rf = 1EP[ξf(ξ)m] , (C.2)
where we have used results in Section 3 and where ξ is the worst-case distortion given by
(14) so that ξf(ξ)m is the pricing kernel under model uncertainty.
We use the following annual U.S. consumption data for the period 1891-1998 (107 years)
from Campbell [2003]:
µc = 1.76%, σc = 3.218%, σS = 18.599%. (C.3)
We compute the probabilities of the three states occuring by requiring that they sum to 1
and match the mean µc and volatility σc of consumption growth which gives probabilities of
approximately 0.3269, 0.3331 and 0.3400. Using (C.1) and (C.2), we compute the standard
deviations of m and ξf(ξ)m, denoted σ(m) and σ(ξf(ξ)m), as well as RNoMUf − 1, Rf − 1,
ERNoMU and ER, all expressed as percentages, for different values of γ and Ω and display
the results in Table C.1, where we set β = 0.9975.
We see that the presence of model uncertainty lowers the risk-free rate, increases the
excess return on the stock and increases the standard deviation of the pricing kernel (thus
raising the Hansen and Jagannathan [1991] bound) relative to its absence.
For comparison with Table C.1, Campbell [2003] gives historical values for the U.S. for
the period 1891-1998 of Rf − 1 = 2.020% and ER = 7.169% - the latter being the excess
return on the U.S. equity market. We compute numerically the values of γ and Ω which
match these historical values - now setting β = 1 - and obtain
γ = 2.14, and Ω = 9.63. (C.4)
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Table C.2: Estimates of Ω for different error detection probabilities (EDP)
EDP 20 20 7 7 6 6 5 5
Distribution LN 3S LN 3S LN 3S LN 3S
Ω 6.28 5.89 9.71 9.15 10.15 9.70 10.62 10.26
Table C.3: Excess returns and risk-free rates for values of Ω consistent with 20% error
detection probabilities
γ Ω σ(m) σ(ξf(ξ)m) RNoMUf − 1 Rf − 1 ERNoMU ER
2.14 5.89 6.63 20.95 3.47 2.70 1.42 4.46
2.14 6.28 6.63 22.28 3.47 2.63 1.42 4.74
2.14 9.63 6.63 33.89 3.47 2.02 1.42 7.17
We observe that the value of the risk aversion parameter γ is not implausibly high - indeed it
is well within the range of 1 to 5 which is usually (Barillas et al. [2009], Maenhout [2004] or
chapter 21, Cochrane [2005]) considered reasonable. But what about the value of Ω? To esti-
mate Ω, we simulate consumption data consistent with the parameters in equation (C.3) for
a time period spanning 107 years. To do this, we make two possible distributional assump-
tions concerning consumption growth. In the first (labelled LN), we assume consumption
growth is log-normally distributed and in the second (labelled 3S), we assume it can take on
the three values above with probabilities 0.3269, 0.3331 and 0.3400 which match µc and σc
and sum to 1. We estimate Ω for four different error detection probabilities (labelled EDP) -
namely 20%, 7%, 6% and 5% - using the error detection probability methodology described
in Section 5. The results are in Table C.2.
We see that the value of Ω = 9.63 in equation (C.4) estimated to match the historical
values of Rf − 1 = 2.020% and ER = 7.169% is consistent with error detection probabilities
in the region of 6% or 7%. These error detection probabilities probabilities are low but not
implausible and are, in fact, very close to those reported in Barillas et al. [2009] (p2407).
We recompute the quantities in Table C.1 with the values of Ω (6.28 for LN, 5.89 for 3S)
corresponding to error detection probabilities of 20% as well as the value of Ω in equation
(C.4) matching the Campbell [2003] data-set, setting β = 1 and γ = 2.14, and report the
results in Table C.3.
We see that error detection probabilities of 20% allow us to approximately triple the
Hansen and Jagannathan [1991] bound σ(m)/EP[m] applicable in the absence of model un-
certainty and takes σ(ξf(ξ)m)/EP[ξf(ξ)m] to around two-thirds of the value required to
match the historical excess return of 7.169%. Hence, we find that, similarly to Barillas
et al. [2009] and Maenhout [2004], model uncertainty can potentially explain the equity pre-
mium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott [1985] - at least in part and possibly in whole - without
increasing the risk-free rate and without implausibly high values of risk aversion γ.
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Table 1: Aversion to model uncertainty
Length of historical data-set 500 1000 2000 4000 8000
Value of Ω 1.83 1.64 1.51 1.41 1.33
Notes: Degree of aversion to model uncertainty as a function of the number of historical observations.
Ω is estimated using the procedure in Section 5, with 65000 bootstrapped samples, setting the confidence
level to 80%. The basis assets are taken to be a risk-free and a defaultable bond.
Table 2: Good deal bounds on Arrow-Debreu securities
Fgood
Ω 1 1.33 1.41 1.51 1.64 1.83 4 8
C 0.7364 0.7334 0.7321 0.7305 0.7282 0.7248 0.6882 0.6667?
C 0.7893 0.7918 0.7929 0.7944 0.7964 0.7997 0.8333? 0.8333?
Fpoor
Ω 1 1.33 1.41 1.51 1.64 1.83 4 8
C 0.0882 0.0831 0.0809 0.0780 0.0738 0.0672 0.0000? 0.0000?
C 0.1939 0.1999 0.2024 0.2057 0.2103 0.2171 0.2903 0.3333?
Farmageddon
Ω 1 1.33 1.41 1.51 1.64 1.83 4 8
C 0.0697 0.0667 0.0655 0.0638 0.0615 0.0581 0.0215 0.0000?
C 0.1226 0.1251 0.1262 0.1277 0.1298 0.1331 0.1667? 0.1667?
Notes: The lower C and upper C good deal bounds as a function of the degree of uncertainty aversion
Ω for the three Arrow-Debreu assets, Fgood, Fpoor and Farmageddon.
? means the good deal bound equals
the relevant arbitrage bound. The basis assets are taken to be a risk-free and a defaultable bond.
Table 3: Optimal hedging portfolios
Ω 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2 4 8
C 0.0697 0.0678 0.0640 0.0596 0.0551 0.0215 0.0000?
w1 -1.1055 -1.0646 -0.9958 -0.9371 -0.8949 -0.8010 0
w2 1.8624 1.7992 1.6972 1.6168 1.5668 1.6011 0
C 0.1226 0.1242 0.1275 0.1316 0.1361 0.1667? 0.1667?
w1 -0.0483 -0.0730 -0.1070 -0.1302 -0.1454 -0.8333 -0.8333
w2 -0.5163 -0.4804 -0.4377 -0.4191 -0.4175 1 1
Notes: The optimal hedging position in the risk-free (w1) and the defaultable (w2) bond for the lower
C and upper C good deal bounds as a function of the degree of uncertainty aversion Ω. The focus asset
is the Arrow-Debreu security that pays in the “armageddon” state, Farmageddon.
? means the good deal
bound equals the relevant arbitrage bound. The basis assets are taken to be a risk-free and a defaultable
bond.
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Table 4: Optimal hedging portfolios (detailed)
Ω 5 5.4 5.45 5.46 5.46125 5.4625 5.46375 5.465
C 0.00655 0.00088 0.00019 0.00005 0.00003 0.00001 0.00000? 0.00000?
w1 -0.7875 -0.7832 -0.7827 -0.7826 -0.7826 -0.7826 0.0000 0.0000
w2 1.6799 1.7133 1.7175 1.7184 1.7185 1.7186 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: The optimal hedging position in the risk-free (w1) and the defaultable (w2) bond for the lower
C good deal bound as a function of the degree of uncertainty aversion Ω. The focus asset is the Arrow-
Debreu security that pays in the “armageddon” state, Farmageddon.
? means the good deal bound equals
the relevant arbitrage bound. The basis assets are taken to be a risk-free and a defaultable bond.
Table 5: Good deal bounds on options on the non-traded asset
Ω 16 8 4 2 1.75 1.5 1.25 1 No MU
European call, strike K = 65
C 0.000 0.058 0.738 2.601 3.051 3.560 4.092 4.445 4.445
C 69.974 47.643 31.606 21.580 20.275 19.035 17.983 17.471 17.471
Risk-neutral price (same tree) 8.937 BS 8.917
European call, strike K = 55
C 0.006 0.360 2.052 5.212 5.880 6.610 7.336 7.782 7.782
C 79.143 56.299 39.356 28.307 26.830 25.417 24.211 23.623 23.623
Risk-neutral price (same tree) 13.483 BS 13.463
European put, strike K = 65
C 0.001 0.188 1.422 3.738 4.196 4.674 5.117 5.350 5.350
C 33.503 27.507 21.406 16.466 15.753 15.068 14.495 14.229 14.229
Risk-neutral price (same tree) 10.151 BS 10.132
Ω 16 8 4 2 1.75 1.5 1.25 1 No MU
American call, strike K = 65
C 0.000 0.234 1.295 3.153 3.555 4.006 4.481 4.809 4.809
Risk-neutral price (same tree) 8.937
American call, strike K = 55
C 5.000 5.000 5.000 6.927 7.360 7.844 8.355 8.695 8.695
Risk-neutral price (same tree) 13.483
American put, strike K = 65
C 5.000 5.000 5.000 6.162 6.475 6.803 7.114 7.284 7.284
Risk-neutral price (same tree) 10.671
Notes: The lower C and upper C good deal bounds on 2 year options on the non-traded asset as a
function of the degree of uncertainty aversion Ω. The basis assets are the traded asset and a one period
risk-free bond, with hedging rebalancing possible every quarter. “BS” refers to the Black and Scholes
[1973] price of the same option. For American options, only the lower good deal bounds C are shown.
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